An ever closer union? The nationalisation of political parties in Switzerland, 1991-2015 by Bochsler, Daniel et al.
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
An ever closer union? The nationalisation of political parties in Switzerland,
1991-2015
Bochsler, Daniel; Mueller, Sean; Bernauer, Julian
Abstract: The contribution of this research note is a systematic description of levels of party nationalisa-
tion in Switzerland, using results from the elections to the Swiss National Council between 1991 and 2015.
Party nationalisation is understood as the territorial homogeneity of a party’s electoral performance and
measured using the inverted and standardised Gini index. Our results indicate a trend towards more
nationalisation in the Swiss party system over the time period covered, and distinct patterns for single
parties. The SVP and the GLP have made big leaps towards stronger nationalisation, with the former
closing in on the levels of the SP and the FDP, while the CVP remains a weakly nationalised party,
considering its size.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12205
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-130705
Accepted Version
Originally published at:
Bochsler, Daniel; Mueller, Sean; Bernauer, Julian (2016). An ever closer union? The nationalisation of
political parties in Switzerland, 1991-2015. Swiss Political Science Review = Schweizerische Zeitschrift
für Politikwissenschaft, 22(1):29-40.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12205
 An Ever Closer Union? 
The Nationalisation of Political Parties in Switzerland, 1991–2015 
 
Daniel Bochsler*, Sean Mueller** and Julian Bernauer** 
*NCCR Democracy and Centre for Democracy Studies Aarau, University of Zurich 
**Institute of Political Science, University of Berne 
 
forthcoming in: Swiss Political Science Review, 2016 
 
Abstract 
The contribution of this research note is a systematic description of levels of party 
nationalisation in Switzerland, using results from the elections to the Swiss National Council 
between 1991 and 2015. Party nationalisation is understood as the homogeneity of a party’s 
electoral performance and measured using the inverted and standardised Gini index. Our 
results indicate a trend towards more nationalisation in the Swiss party system over the time 
period covered, and distinct patterns for single parties. The SVP and the GLP have made big 
leaps towards stronger nationalisation, with the former closing in on the levels of the SP and 
the FDP, while the CVP remains a weakly nationalised party, considering its size.  
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 1 Introduction 
This research note discusses the nationalisation of political parties in Switzerland, using data 
from seven federal elections to measure and discuss change and stability. Nationalisation 
refers to the extent of territorial heterogeneity in electoral results – or, in other words, the 
distribution of party success across territory (Caramani 2004, Bochsler 2010a). In 
Switzerland, the politically most relevant territorial units for national elections are the 26 
Swiss cantons, which also serve as electoral districts for elections to the National Council and 
the Council of States (Bernauer and Mueller 2015). 
Party nationalisation matters because it has the potential to unify the political preferences of 
the entire population and support the centralisation of powers (Riker 1964, 181); it affects the 
political economy (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas 2009; Crisp et al. 2013; Jurado 2014); and it 
alters the effect of the electoral system (Bochsler 2010c). Thus the political history of Western 
Europe as one of functional cleavages superseding territorial ones through party 
nationalisation (Caramani 2004). By contrast, low degrees of party nationalisation, i.e. 
persistent and systematic diversity in electoral fortunes of different parties in different 
regions, legitimise decentralised, federal and/or regionalised state structures (Filippov et al. 
2004, 180). The best example here is the break-up of Belgian federal parties along linguistic 
community lines (Maddens and Swenden 2009; Lacey 2014, 68). 
However, the debate on causal relations between party nationalisation and state centralisation 
is far from settled, with some arguing for causality running from institutional structures 
through party organisation to nationalisation (e.g. Duchacek 1987, 329; Chandler 1987, 151; 
Harbers 2010) and others arguing the opposite (e.g. Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 223 and 
227; Bochsler 2010b, 809–13). In any case, it transpires that valid and reliable measurement is 
key. Only in this way can we analyse both the reasons and the consequences of different 
degrees of party nationalisation. This contribution provides such a measure and applies it to 
National Council elections in Switzerland between 1991 and 2015. 
What is more, Switzerland presents a particularly interesting case. On the one hand, its federal 
and electoral institutions have remained constant since the introduction of proportionality and 
the fixation of cantons as undivided constituencies in 1919 (Knapp 1986, 34-5).1 At the same 
time, the Swiss political system has remained highly decentralised, with both cantons and 
local governments possessing a wide-range of legislative, executive and fiscal powers (Vatter 
                                                 
1 Except for the infamously late introduction of the female suffrage in 1971, of course. Also, every 
once in a while seats in the National Council are redistributed to the cantons to take into account 
shifting demographics. 
 2014; Mueller 2015). Political parties too are formally organised in a bottom-up fashion; 
historically, national parties have grown out of federations of cantonal branches (Gruner 
1984). Finally, national and cantonal office-holders have often first served at the cantonal and 
local level, respectively (Koch et al. 2013), and candidate selection is widely decentralised, 
too (Mueller 2015, 83-86). All this would favour low degrees of party nationalisation. 
On the other hand, however, the Swiss system also provides for what Lacey (2014, 62) calls a 
“unified and robust voting space” (emphasis omitted), where particularly through direct 
democracy the people are called to vote on specific policies several times every year. This 
creates a national space of decision-making and nationalises the political discourse to the 
extent that deliberators interact horizontally (Tresch 2008) as well as vertically (Stojanovic 
2011, 106), that is across cantons and with the federal level. Yet cantonal parties continue to 
issue vote recommendations that deviate from their federal party (Bochsler and Bousbah 
2015; even if less and less; cf. Mueller and Bernauer 2015), and while direct democracy has 
been in place for over a century2, a great many changes in Swiss politics have taken place 
only over the last few decades. This regards notably the polarisation of actors and a 
professionalisation of campaigns (Bochsler et al. 2015, Vatter 2014). The media, particularly 
the most commercialised ones, have also paid more and more attention to executive as 
opposed to legislative elections, leading Udris et al. (2015, 591) to speak of an increased 
personalisation and even “presidentialisation”. And even when it comes to electoral results, 
the recent decades have witnessed more and more unity across the Swiss territory (Armingeon 
1998, Bochsler and Sciarini 2006; Bernauer and Mueller 2015). Thus, there are grounds to 
suspect higher levels of party nationalisation today than before. 
In sum, the real-world behaviour of actors (voters and parties) has shown less and less 
territorial diversity while the institutions (particularly federalism and proportionality) 
continue to favour fragmentation along both territorial and ideological lines. The role of direct 
democracy, finally, is ambivalent: having favoured the emergence of a national identity 
(Stojanovic 2011), it also enables cantonal (party) deviations and contributes to maintaining 
decentralisation (Mueller et al. 2015). And in several periods, referendums and initiatives 
have even served to emphasise territorial cleavages, rather than foster unity. The next section 
places this debate into a wider context and develops specific expectations. Section three 
presents our method, data and results. Section four discusses these results before we conclude. 
                                                 
2 The two most important (and bottom-up) instruments of direct democracy, the optional referendum 
(challenging an Act of Parliament) and the popular initiative (proposing a partial revision of the Federal 
Constitution), have existed since 1874 and 1891, respectively. 
  
2 Definition, relevance and expectations 
Party nationalisation is a widely debated issue. One of the reasons for this popularity is the 
fact that the concept lies at the intersection of federalism and multilevel governance, on the 
one hand, and party politics and political behaviour, on the other. Accordingly, there are 
different labels, theoretical approaches and methodologies, depending on whether one is 
interested in the drivers of voting behaviour in a cross-sectional perspective (e.g. Armingeon 
1998), comparisons of systemic properties over time and space (e.g. Bochsler and 
Wasserfallen 2013), or the internal organisation of political parties (e.g. Thorlakson 2007). In 
this contribution, we define party nationalisation as the degree to which a party’s electoral 
support is uniformly distributed across a given territory (cf. also Bochsler 2010a, 155). 
Hence, a perfectly nationalised party would have exactly the same vote share in all territorial 
units; and the more territorial variation there is in terms electoral success, the less nationalised 
that party. 
The second reason for the concept’s popularity is the flexible use that can be made of it. As 
organisations between the state and the people, parties are ideally placed to detect changes in 
either. Increases in overall party nationalisation could thus point towards more state 
centralisation, with parties mirroring the institutional set-up, and/or an increasing 
homogeneity in the electorate and its political preferences, which in turn could be due to, for 
example, the standardisation of media messages and of party campaigns throughout the 
national territory, or the general disappearance of residence as a factor influencing political 
preferences. In this contribution we are interested in three different aspects of party 
nationalisation: party-specific, canton-specific and changes over time. 
The party-specific focus is concerned with different nationalisation degrees across political 
parties: Why are some parties more nationalised than others? The literature provides us with 
different reasons and corresponding hypotheses, which can be complemented with Swiss-
specific insights. In essence, this builds on Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who have distinguished 
different dimensions of political and social cleavages. Functional cleavages – primarily the 
economic cleavage between the working class and the owners of capital – usually do not mark 
sharp territorial demarcation lines. Parties organised along this cleavage would thus usually 
gain a rather homogeneous support across the territory. Other cleavages are by definition 
territorial: they separate the centre of a country from its periphery or the urban from the rural 
 areas. The degree of territorialisation of the fourth major cleavage, pitting actors of the secular 
state against those of the (Catholic) church, depends on the specific context.  
In the Swiss case, the religious cleavage has become territorialised through the civil war in 
1847 and the subsequent Kulturkampf that pitted the Protestant and more liberal city-cantons 
against the Catholic-conservative cantons of Central Switzerland plus Fribourg and Valais. 
Hence, with our canton-specific focus we aim to detect regional outliers. Why are in some 
cantons completely different parties the dominant force than in all the others? The Swiss 
cantons are not only autonomous but also diverse. Some have a Catholic, some a Protestant 
majority, whereas in Basel-City and Neuchâtel, the plurality group are persons with no 
confession at all; most are entirely or exclusively German-speaking, some French-speaking, 
and one each Italian-speaking and trilingual; some are 100% urban, others 100% rural; some 
are rich, some are poor; some are still very industrialised, others almost entirely reliant on 
services3. But are there, to paraphrase George Orwell, cantons that are yet more diverse than 
all the others? More particularly, are the mainly Catholic cantons still that different from the 
rest of Switzerland? In keeping with the cleavage approach, this should be reflected in 
relatively lower nationalisation scores for the Christian-Democratic Party (CVP). 
However, a cantonal comparison is hampered by two factors: size and electoral system (cf. 
also Bernauer and Mueller 2015). In fact, while the electoral law for the elections of the first 
chamber of parliament is nominally the same for all 26 cantons, in effect it differs widely. In 
2015, the magnitude of the 26 electoral districts (equal to the 26 cantons) varied between 1 
and 35 mandates. Switzerland thus belongs to the countries with the largest variance in 
district magnitude worldwide. Six cantons elect their National Councillor in a single-seat 
district, by plurality rule, and only seven out of 26 cantons count at least 10 seats so that they 
are effectively proportional (Lutz and Selb 2007). 
Finally, our time-specific focus is interested in the extent of change since 1991, when the 
transformation of Swiss politics began in the wake of the end of the Cold War and at the start 
of Europeanisation. The central hypothesis to be tested here is that Switzerland has become an 
ever closer union. This means that overall party nationalisation has increased despite both 
party- and canton-specific peculiarities. 
 
                                                 
3 Cf. “Regional comparison of selected indicators (Cantons)”, Federal Office of Statistics, at 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/en/index/regionen/kantone/daten.html (last accessed 8 January 
2016). 
 3 Method, data and results 
The empirical analysis is based on the election results for the National Council of Switzerland 
(first chamber), from 1991 to 2015, aggregated to the level of cantons. To measure party 
nationalisation, we need to tackle several methodological challenges. First, any measure of 
territorial (in)variance requires a valid definition of parties. While this is trivial in many other 
countries, Switzerland stands out by virtue of the fact that it lacks any party law or party 
register, and parties have grown as loose federations of cantonal groups. In the period of 
investigation, the Radical-Liberals (Freisinnig-Demokratische Partei, FDP) have merged with 
the smaller, and only regionally present Liberal Party (Liberale Partei der Schweiz, LPS), 
although while being united nationally, in two cantons (Vaud and Basel-City) they have 
conserved their separate party organisations and compete against each other. Other examples 
include the CVP and the Christian Social Party (CSP) – in some cantons organised as a 
faction of the Christian Democrats, in others (like Obwalden) completely independent – , or 
the Green party, which has developed as a federation of various local or cantonal ecological 
movements and proto-parties.4 For our party classification, we thus follow the Swiss Federal 
Office of Statistics in collaboration with the Centre for Democracy Studies in Aarau,5 which 
in turn rely on information obtained from cantonal party branches. 
Second, while Switzerland is usually treated as a country with proportional representation in 
the National Council, a number of cantons elects the parliament in very small districts. In 
single-seat cantons, only the largest parties are meaningful competitors. When a party decides 
not to run with a candidate in a canton, it is assigned a vote share of 0 in this canton. In the 
rare instances of tacit elections, we proceed accordingly, assigning a vote share of 0 to parties 
which did not run and 100% to the party winning the seat, with a fictitious turnout equal to 
the country’s average that year. 
Third and finally, we need to calculate a measure of the degree to which political parties rely 
on regional strongholds, or whether they gain similar vote shares across the whole territory. 
The calculation of our standardised party nationalisation score is based on an (inverted) Gini 
index of inequality, where unequal support across the territory is considered as inequality 
(Bochsler 2010a). Hence, parties gaining all their votes in a single canton are assigned low 
                                                 
4 Still today, in the Swiss capital Bern, four to five Green parties co-exist, ranging from a split-off of 
the Radicals (Grüne Freie Liste) to a group with marxist-leninist provenance (Grünes Bündnis), a 
dogmatic ecological left-wing party (Grüne Partei Bern), a young movement (Junge Alternative), the 
de facto youth wing of the Grünes Bündnis, and finally, since 2007, an ecologically oriented right-
wing party (Grünliberale Partei) (Seitz, 2008; Bochsler and Wasserfallen, 2013). 
5 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/02.html (last accessed 3 January 2016). 
 values close to 0, whereas parties with a similar vote share across the country are assigned 
values closer to 1. The standardised version of the index accounts for the very unequal sizes 
of the cantons and is comparable to other countries, where the number of territorial units is 
different. 
Figure 1 shows the party nationalisation scores for the main parties in Switzerland at each 
National Council election from 1991 to 2015. The score for the party system as such is a 
weighted measure calculated from the individual party scores. We see that the largest parties – 
the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the Socialists (SP), the FDP, and the CVP – are all located in 
the upper part of the scale, although the CVP is clearly the least nationalised because its 
support concentrated mainly on the Catholic majority cantons. The most important change in 
the period of investigation was the rise of the national-conservative SVP, which was 
connected to the party’s expansion into all Swiss cantons, and which accordingly brought a 
substantial increase in its level of nationalisation. 
 
Figure 1: Party nationalisation in Switzerland, 1991–2015 
 
 
 The rise of the Swiss People’s Party is closely linked to a programmatic and territorial 
transformation of the party: programmatically, the party could profit from the new cultural 
conflict in Swiss politics (Kriesi 2015) on the GAL-TAN issue dimension.6 Since the late 
1980s, the former centrist party of farmers and shopkeepers has gradually taken over the 
leadership of a new nationalist-conservative pole, which is opposed to integration in 
international and supranational organisations (EU and UN) and immigration and which 
defends traditionalist cultural values (Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2015). While until the 
1990s, the party was only present in protestant and agricultural cantons and strongest in the 
German-speaking parts of the country, the transformation to a new nationalist-conservative 
party of the right was spearheaded by the Zurich branch of the party. New cantonal branches 
were set up in catholic cantons (where the party was previously not present), followed by 
intense internal struggles and the re-orientation of traditional cantonal branches and, since the 
2000s, the move towards the French-speaking cantons. 
Nevertheless, in the French- and especially the Italian-speaking parts, the party is still less 
successful, as even in the most recent elections of October 2015, its main gains can be 
attributed to the German-speaking cantons. This can partly be explained by the somehow 
more favourable view of European integration held be French-speaking electorates (although 
the differences between the linguistic regions have declined, see Kriesi et al. 1996), and partly 
by political leadership, which remains dominated by German-speakers. Also, in Ticino (where 
most Italian-speakers live) and in Geneva (one of the six French-speaking cantons) many 
positions of the Swiss People’s Party are represented by the Lega dei Ticinesi (Lega) and the 
Mouvement citoyens genevois (MCG), respectively, which operate exclusively at the regional 
level. Both parties have resisted the attempts of the SVP to either challenge their local 
dominance in the anti-migration camp or absorb them altogether. In the course of its rise, the 
Swiss People’s Party has also incorporated large parts of the personnel and voters of several 
other small parties of the nationalist-conservative camp, especially the Freedom Party of 
Switzerland (earlier the Car Party), as well as the Swiss Democrats. As the two were present 
in similar cantons as the SVP, this has brought the SVP new voters, but it has not altered the 
territorial variance of the SVP’s support to a major degree. 
Thus, except for the somehow lower ratings in the French- and Italian-speaking parts, the 
SVP has now a widely nationalised electorate. And after a split of a small group of more 
                                                 
6 GAL stands for Green, Alternative, Libertarian; TAN for Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalist. 
 moderate politicians (who dominated the party until the 1990s) in 2008, the party takes 
countrywide widely homogeneous positions. 
Furthermore, in the long-run the Swiss People’s Party threatens the predominance of the 
Christian Democrats in their traditional Catholic strongholds (cf. also Bochsler 2013). In 
referenda, the SVP could already gain considerable support for its key issues (non-integration 
in Europe and anti-immigration) in rather rural and conservative Catholic regions. And with 
the establishment of new party branches in Catholic cantons, the SVP has also 
organisationally penetrated deeply into the Christian-Democratic territory. The Christian 
Democrats without a doubt remains a party which gains most of its support in its traditional 
strongholds – however, it is under heavy pressure by the SVP even there. 
The two other large parties, the SP and the FDP, are formed along functional cleavages, i.e. 
mainly the economic left-right cleavage, which typically does not follow territorial lines as 
hypothesised above. In catholic cantons, the FDP also captures the more secular voters, so 
that they are equally represented in the Christian Democratic strongholds. Thus, the FDP has 
historically had a rather nationalised structure. In 2009, the Liberal-Radicals merged with the 
much smaller but programmatically similar Liberal Party, which used to be represented 
almost exclusively in a few French-speaking cantons and Basel-City, so that the regional 
version of the Liberals has disappeared7, leading to an even more nationalised structure of the 
party system. 
The other, smaller parties possess a much less homogeneous representation throughout the 
country. The Green Liberals are represented almost exclusively in the rather urbanised 
cantons of the German-speaking part; the BDP in protestant, rather rural and German-
speaking cantons. The Green party has a wider territorial coverage, but faces difficulties in 
several small cantons, especially where restrictive electoral systems for national (and 
sometimes also for cantonal) elections reduce competition to the benefit mainly of the largest 
parties (Selb and Pituctin 2010; Bernauer and Mueller 2015). Yet smaller parties such as the 
above-mentioned Lega, the MCG, the Christian Social Party of Obwalden (not to be 
confounded with the national Christian Social Party) exist, although they gain parliamentary 
representation only in single cantons. Small parties represented in the national parliament with 
somehow more national aspirations, although with their votes concentrated mainly on a few 
strongholds, include the Evangelic People’s Party (EVP) and the Communist Party (PdA). 
                                                 
7 Although in two cantons, Basel-City and Vaud, the previous LPS has transformed into a largely 
autonomous cantonal branch within the FDP, see above. 
 Thus, with the decline of the Christian-Democrats and the nationalisation of the Swiss 
People’s Party, overall territorial variance in Swiss elections has declined over the past 
decades, but remained roughly stable since 2011 (Bochsler, Gerber and Zumbach, 
forthcoming). Of the four parties currently in federal government, the SP – the main advocate 
of standardisation, egalitarianism and thus centralisation (Mueller 2015) – has consistently 
been the most nationalised party, while the CVP – the traditional defender of the Catholic-
conservative cantonal minority – has equally consistently been the least nationalised party. 
 
Figure 2: Vote share of the Social Democratic Party in 2015, by canton 
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However, even in the case of the most nationalised SP, a comparison of its cantonal results in 
2015 still shows quite some variance (Figure 2). There are two main reasons for this. The first 
is cleavage-based: The party tends to gain more support in urban (e.g. BS, GE, ZH) and 
French-speaking cantons (FR, JU, NE, VD, GE) than in rural and/or German-speaking 
cantons. On the other hand, the very small cantons, with only one or two mandates (SH, JU, 
UR, OW, NW, GL, AR, AI), are persistent outliers, as the electoral result relies on a very 
restricted field of competitors and strategic effects. Therefore, the electoral result for the very 
same parties tends to fluctuate massively between cantonal and national elections (Bochsler 
 and Wasserfallen 2013) as well as between subsequent elections. So the cantons themselves 
continue to matter, but only a more systematic analysis can reveal the relative impact of 
technical and structural factors present within the cantons (cf. also Bernauer and Mueller). 
This is also summarised in our third part of the analysis, where we have calculated how much 
the National Council election results in each canton deviate from the national average. 
Therefore, we have calculated for each canton a score which measures the difference between 
the election results in the canton from the national mean. The measure is based on Gallagher’s 
(1991) index of disproportionality, i.e. on the sum of the squared deviations. Again, cantons 
with one or two mandates score very highly. The only exceptions, with high deviations 
despite only medium-sized district magnitude, are Ticino (TI), due to the Lega (see above), 
and Valais (VS), a traditional and persistent stronghold of the CVP.8 
Figure 3: Deviation of cantonal election results from national average, 2015 
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4 Discussion and Conclusion 
This research note has centred on the concept of party nationalisation, which measures the 
homogeneity of a party’s electoral results across territorial units of a polity. Nationalised 
parties are often regarded as a requirement for strong centralised government, and levels of 
                                                 
8 The results look very similar for the entire period of 1991 to 2015. 
 nationalisation interact for instance with electoral systems in creating outcomes such as 
electoral proportionality. For varying reasons, such as lacking consolidation of political 
systems, regionalised media systems, fractionalised party organisation, mobilisation on 
territorially shaped issues, societal diversity, or institutional factors (e.g. federalism or 
proportionality), nationalisation can be low for single parties or even whole party systems. 
Switzerland is a classic example of a system where historical, institutional and political 
conditions have enabled also less nationalised parties to play a role. However, changes in the 
media system (concentration, commercialisation and personalisation) as well as an increasing 
polarisation of the party system, associated most notably with the rise of the SVP, have 
created questions about how this affects party nationalisation. Thus we have investigated 
Swiss parties’ varying levels of nationalisation as well as some of the temporal trends 
involved. Methodologically, this research note relies on an inverted Gini index of party 
nationalisation, with a limit of 1 for perfectly nationalised parties and approaching 0 for 
heterogeneous cases.  
Covering elections to the Swiss National Council between 1991 and 2015, a number of 
observations can be made. First, there is a moderate trend towards higher levels of 
nationalisation at the level of the party system. The rise occurred in the first period 
investigated here, that is between 1991 and 2003, but has remained rather stable since. 
Second, this trend is not driven by a uniform development across all parties, as mainly the 
SVP (as well as the GLP) have made big leaps, while other parties remain at relatively high 
(SP and FDP), relatively low (CVP) or extremely low (Lega) levels of nationalisation. Third, 
even the most nationalised Swiss parties have some variance in the distribution of their 
electoral results across territorial units – in particular as some Cantons only send one MP to 
the National Council.  
Where does all this leave us with regard to the wider debate? There are two avenues of 
research for which our findings would seem to be relevant. On the one hand, from a 
perspective of territorial politics, decentralised party systems are essential to the guarantee of 
a federal division of labour (e.g. Riker 1964). Increasing party nationalisation could thus be 
read as either a consequence or a cause of a more centralised political system. To test this 
relationship in a comparative perspective, the literature has matched the shifts in party system 
nationalisation (or equivalent: regionalist party support) with data on government 
centralisation, and looked at the party positions regarding regionalism and at separatist claims 
(cf. Heller 2002; Chhibber and Kollman 2004, 223 and 227; Brancati 2006; Bochsler 2010b, 
809–13; Harbers 2010; Toubeau & Massetti 2013; Lublin 2012). 
 On the other hand, political preferences tend to cluster in territorial spaces, and political 
behaviour is influenced by the spatial context, in turn. This is the observation of the literature 
on social cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), but also of studies on the spatial context of 
elections (Wright 1977; Weakliem 1997, etc.). For the Swiss case, Christmann & Salamina 
(2013) have analysed contextual effects on voting behaviour, relying on both aggregated and 
individual data. In Switzerland, the increase in the nationalisation of political parties is 
symptomatic for the change of political cleavages. Thus, the territory-based cleavage, 
separating protestant from catholic-conservative positions, is increasingly losing in 
importance to the benefit of the GAL-TAN issue dimension, which is less strongly 
territorially structured.  
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